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INTRODUCTION 
Sea carriers in the past, have extended liability to their ser-
vants, agents and sub-contractors through Himalaya clauses in the bills 
of lading. However, there has been a complicated legal debate over third 
party liability and exemption clauses in the contract of carriage by sea. 
Complicated issues have made it difficult to determine who bears respon-
sibility for the goods from carriage to delivery. This will affect the 
introduction of adequate insurance rates, which will in turn, apply to eff-
icient rates of carriage. 
Some of the difficulties had been overcome by an established prin-
ciple of vicarious liability. However, this principle was short lived, as 
it was severely restricted and later, well defunct. 
The Privy Council decision of A. M. Satterthwaite and Co. Ltd. v 
1  New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd., did successfully transfer indemnity to a 
third party. However, the High Court decision of Port Jackson Stevedoring 
Pty. Ltd. v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Pty. Ltd. failed to apply 
the Eurymedon doctrine. Therefore, although the Enrymedon  was not over 
ruled, there was still opposition to third party indemnity under bills of 
lading. The High Court initiated a search for fine distinctions involving 
the capacity issue, construction of the agreement, consideration, agency 
and fundamental breach. 
The New York Star was appealed to the Privy Council, which re-
versed the decision of the High Court. The status of third party liabil- 
1Hereafter referred to as the Eurymedon  
2:Hereafter referred to as the New York Star 
1 
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ity was still somewhat unsettled until the matter was again tested and up- 
held in Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaf 
and others, and Sidney Cooke Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaf and  
Another, decisions. 
The principles in the House of Lord's decision in the New York 
Star, which allowed the exclusion of stevedores under a bill of lading, 
were transferred to the road haulage industry in Celthene Pty. Ltd. v 
W.K.J. Hauliers Pty. Ltd. and Another, and upheld in Life Savers (Austral-
asia) Ltd. v Frigmobile Pty. Ltd. and Another. 
It is apparent from these recent decisions, that a properly worded 
limitation or exclusion clause, can operate to exempt the carrier's ser-
vants, agents and independent contractors, from liability for damage or 
loss of goods. Such an understanding makes it easier for cargo owners to 
ascertain the risk they undertake when shipping their freight, and to 
arrange for appropriate insurance coverage. The carrier, knowing that 
his servants, agents and independent contractors employed from time to 
time, are exempted from liability, can set competitive rates of carriage, 
and discard high insurance costs. 
CHAPTER I 
THE EFFECT OF THIRD PARTY LIABILITY 
ON FREIGHT RATES 
The Himalaya Clause  
The bill of lading is a standard form document which is issued and 
signed by the carrier, acknowledging that specific goods have been deliv-
ered to him for shipment. The bill of lading itself acts as evidence of 
the previously concluded contract of carriage and its terms. It also acts 
as a receipt for goods, with reference generally being made to their nat-
ure, quantity, condition and packaging. 
A carrier's liability with respect to damages to goods may be lim-
ited by a clause in the contract. Often the carrier will attempt to ex-
tend the limitation of liability to third parties, in particular steve-
doring companies which have been hired by the carrier to offload and store 
the goods in a dockside warehouse. The provision which has been used for 
the express purpose of exempting the carrier's servants, agents and ind-
ependent contractors, is known as a'Himalaya clause. 1 
1 The Himalaya clause had originated on a PO passenger liner, the 
Himalaya. In June 1982, the plaintiff decided to take a cruise leaving 
from Southampton aboard the steamship Himalaya. On July 16th, the ship 
docked at Trieste. The plaintiff, on returning from .a daily excursion in 
port, fell from the gangway after it had suddenly come adrift from the 
gantry at the shore end. She suffered severe injuries, and thus claimed 
damages against the master and the boatswain of the ship, alleging that 
they were negligent in failing to see the gangway was properly secured. 
The defendants argued that the limitations of liability set out in the 
p&O passenger ticket, which exempted AO from claims alleging negligence, 
was also available to their employees._ The English Court of Appeal ruled 
that the contract did not refer specifiCally to the extension of limita-
tion clauses to the employees, and that exemptions were only available to 
P&O. Adler v Dickson [1954] 3 All E.R. 21 
3 
4 
Risk and Freight Rates  
Stevedores have been relying on the 'Himalaya' clause, when seek4: 
ing immunity under the bill of lading. Stevedore immunity, or lack of 
immunity, under the transfer of exemption clauses contained in the bill of 
lading, is an important factor in debermining the freight rates. If it is 
possible to distinguish who bears the responsibility for the goods from 
origin to destination, apportionment of risk may be determined for app-
ropriate insurance coverage. 
Insurance coverage will be apparent in the freight rate, if the 
carrier is to be responsible for the diligence of his employees or sub-
contractors. Therefore, a limitation on the right of recovery against 
the carrier, or his servants and agents, will only result in higher pre-
miums. If the carrier is not responsible, then the owner of the goods 
may take it upon his own initiative to insure his freight. However, it 
may not be in the cargo owner's interest to bear the burden of increased 
premiums in a highly competitive market. If insurance coverage is necess-
ary for protection against loss or damage to high value commodities, in-
surers will need to know the extent to which the carrier has limited his 
liability. 
The legal implications of the validity of the 'Himalaya' clause, 
would be of interest to the International Cargo Handling Co-ordination 
Association, in determining efficient rates of carriage. However, the 
legal debate has been complicated. It has proven difficult for a third 
party (stevedore), to benefit from an exemption clause in a contract of 
carriage, as the' third party, in a legal sense, has been deemed a stranger 
to the contract. 
In practice, a number of situations arise in which justice in 
general, and business convenience in particuinr, requires that a contract 
be allowed to affect persons outside it. To expand on this point, an ex- 
5 
amination of the rules pertaining to privity of contract becomes necess-
ary, as these rules ascertain which parties may benefit under contractual 
terms. 
CHAPTER II 
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT 
The Strict Doctrines Underlying 
Privity of Contract 
As indicated earlier, the principle parties to the contract of 
carriage are the cargo owner and the carrier. They are pfivy to the con-
tract. However, it should be noted that as a usual commercial practice, 
the carrier may sub-contract to another sea carrier. More often, he will 
sub-contract the tasks of stevedoring and delivery of the cargo to the 
consignee. The carrier in the combined transport operation may have sub-
contracted several times, to anyone who performs part of the carriage, such 
as stevedores, road hauliers, or terminal operators, for loading, off load-
ing, storage and final delivery. 
The objective of the carrier and his sub-contractors, is to in-
clude a provision in the bill of lading which gives the carrier the right 
to engage sub-contractors from time to time. Therefore, when the cargo 
owner signs the contract, he is in effect allowing the carrier's sub-con-
tractors to perform some of the obligations of carriage under the bill of 
lading. 
In this way, the cargo owner has, by express agreement, permitted 
the exclusion of liability of a third party. However, the doctrines un-
derlying privity of contract provide that the jurisdiction of the contract, 
or its power to affect regulations, should be confined to the parties who 
created it. Although this reasoning seems sound, the whole contract is 
of a commercial nature, involving a number of independent services on the 
carrier's side. 
6 
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Vicarious liability 
The House of Lords decision in Elder, Dempster & Co. v Paterson 
Zochonis & Co .1 had overcome some of the problems relating to third party 
claims under a bill of lading. It was held in that case, that exclusion 
clauses in the bill of lading would not only protect the charterer, but 
the shipowners as well even though the shipowners were not parties to the 
contract. Viscount Cave, in his decision, established a principle of 'vi-
carious liability'. 2 
• . . the owners were not direct parties to the contract; but 
they took possession of the goods . • . on behalf of and as the 
agents of the charterers, and so can claim the same protection . . . 3 
In a later House of Lords decision, Scruttons Ltd. v Midland Sil- 
icones Ltd.,  4  Lord Keith of Avonholm distinguished the Elder, Dempster & 
Co. case, stipulating that it involved a bailment upon terms. 
. . . the bills of lading were signed by the master of the ship, 
the cargo was received by the ship and the owners, with the ass-
ent of the shippers, on the same conditions as regards immunity 
in respect of stowage as had been obtained by the charterers un-
der their contract of carriage.5 
Lord Keith had therefore severely restricted the decision in the Elder 
Dempster & Co. case. 
In the case of Scruttons Ltd. v Midland Silicones Ltd., the rules 
under privity of contract were again tested in a situation involving the 
exclusion of stevedores as third parties in a contract of carriage by 
1 [1924] All E.R. 135. In that case, a shipping company damaged 
the plaintiff's cargo through bad stowage. The bill of lading contained 
a clause of exclusion that purported to exclude liability on the part of 
the charterers, and the shipowners for bad stowage. The shipowners were 
not parties to the contract. 
2Yates, Exclusion Clauses in Contracts, p. 103. 
3Elder, Dempster & - C  . v Paterson, Zochonis & Co. ibid., 141 
4(1962) A.C. 446 
5- - ibid., 481 
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sea. 1 It was held that they were not entitled to limitations of liability, 
because .they were not parties to the bill of lading and were liable for 
damages. The stevedores also never obtained possession of the goods and 
could not gain protection under the rules in Elder, Dempster & Co. v Pat- 
.. erson, Zochonis & Co., as bailees. It should be noted also, that under 
the United Kingdom Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: 
If an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier 
(such servant or agent not being an independent contractor), such 
servant or agent shall be entitled to avail himself of the def-
ences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to 
envoke under these rules.2 
In many cases, the stevedore has acted as an independent contract-
or, and therefore can not be afforded protection. Lord Reid in Scruttons  
Ltd. v Midland Silicones Ltd., did nevertheless, leave open the situation 
where one of the parties to a bill of lading contracts as an agent for a 
third person. In the decision of the High Court of Australia in Wilson v 
Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co. Ltd., the point arose as to 
whether the stevedoring company engaged by the shipowner could be regard-
ed as an agent of the shipowner. Fullager J. stated: 
. . . the word 'agent' appears to me to be often misused in this. 
connection . . It seems to me quite wrong to say that a steve-
doring company engaged by a shipowner to load or unload a ship 
is an agent of the shipowner, just as it would be wrong to sgy 
that a builder is an agent of a building owner. If A engages B 
to lay out a garden for him, and B engages C to do the actual 
work, C is not in any intelligible legal sence B's agent. B is 
an independent contractor with A. Agency in the legal sense 
does not come into the matter.3 
1 r 0962] A.C. 446. In that case, shipowners issued to the shipp- 
ers of a drum containing chemicals, a bill of lading, by the tams of 
which they were entitled to limit their liability of the goods were dam-
aged through their negligence. The drum was damaged during its loading 
by stevedores. The shippers sued the stevedores, who claimed to be en-
titled to limit their liability in accordance with the terms in the bill 
of lading. 
2Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1971, art. 4, r. 2. 
3 (1956) 95 C.L.R. 70 
9 
Fullagar J. also distinguished Elder, Dempster & Co. v Paterson, Zochonis  
& Co. upon the fact that the ship's master signed the bill of lading, and 
overall, "refused to accept Elder, Dempster & Co. v Paterson, Zochonis & 
CO. as authority for a general rule of law of bailment.“ 1 
The argument put forward by Fullagar J. above does not suggest 
that the carrier may never act as an agentfor the stevedore. The way 
was still open for the construction of an agency contract. Lord Reid in 
Scruttons Ltd. v Midland Silicones Ltd. indicated that, the stevedore must 
be clearly intended to be covered by the exclusion clause, that the carrier 
must make it plain that he is acting as agent, that he has the stevedore's 
authority to so act, and that any questions concerning consideration mov-
ing from the stevedore are settled, then a contract between shipper and 
stevedore, where the carrier acts as agent for the stevedore is quite 
possible. 
1 Palmer, Bailment, p. 1002. 
CHAPTER III 
THE NEW YORK STAR 
The New York Star 1  was an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, from the High Court of Australia. In the case, the plain-
tiffs were the consignees of a cargo of razor blades shipped on the New 
York Star for delivery at Sydney. Clause 2 of the bill of lading stated: 
. . . that no servant or agent of the Carrier (including every 
independent contractor from time to time employed by the Carrier) 
shall in any circumstances whatsoever be under any liability 
whatsoever to the Shipper . . . for any loss, damage or delay of 
whatsoever kind arising or resulting directly or indirectly from 
any act, neglect or default on his part . . . the Carrier is or 
shall be deemed to be acting as agent . . . for the benefit of 
all persons who are or might be his servants or agents from time 
to time (including independent contractors as aforesaid) • . .2 
Clause 17 of the bill of lading stated: 
In any event the Carrier and the ship shall be discharged from 
all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is 
brought within one year after the delivery of the goods . . .3 
After discharge from the vessel, the goods were placed in a ware-
house, and later stolen. After twelve months from the time when the goods 
should have been delivered, the plaintiffs claimed damages from both def-
endants (stevedores and carrier) who denied liability. 
The bill of lading with its Himalaya or exemption clause is the 
result of the commercial bargain between the shipper and the carrier. If 
it can be deemed that the stevedores are also parties to the bill of lad-
ing, by reason of the extension of liability in the contract, then they 
1 [19801 3 All E.R. 257 
2 (1978) 18"A.L:R. 333 
334 - 
1 0 
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will be afforded protection under its provisions thereof. 
Capacity 
In the light of third party liability in the New York Star, the 
first aspect to be considered is the capacity point, which refers to 
whether or not the exemption clauses under the bill of lading, cease to 
have any operation after the goods have passed over the ship's rail during 
offloading. 
In the High Court decision of the New York Star, 1 Barwick C.J. 
applied the Eurymedon2  doctrine. The negligent act in that case occurred 
during offloading, a drill was dropped and damaged. It was clearly an act 
committed in the delivery of the goods. The carrier in this case was re-
quired under provisions in the bill of lading to give actual delivery, and 
he engaged the stevedore to do this. In the New York Star, the negligent 
act occurred at a time when the goods were being stored after discharge 
from Ship's tackle. Although Barwick C.J. noted the distinction between 
the facts of the two cases, it did not deter him from applying the prin-
ciple to incidents occurring after the goods had left the ship's tackle, 
to a time when they were stacked and stored in a warehouse awaiting future 
delivery. Barwick C.J. commented on their Lordship's decision in the 
Eurymedon, stipulating that they had not restricted the extension of imm-
unity of liability beyond delivery: 
• . . the event which gave rise to liability in the stevedore in 
the Rurymedon occurred before the ship's obligation to deliver 
had been performed. Thus the stevedore at the time of that event 
was excluding on behalf of the carrier part of the contract of 
carriage. Here (in the New York Star) the event giving rise to 
liability in the stevedore occurred after the carriage by the 
ship . • . but before the consignee had obtained delivery of the 
consignment. Thus it can be properly said that their Lordship's 
decision related in terms only to the period of carriage. But 
their Lordships in expressing themselves did not use any language 
1 ( 1978) 18 A .L .R . 333 
2 [,975] A.C. 154 
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which would confine the principle of their decision to the act-
ivities of the stevedore up to the time the goods became free 
of the ship's tackle. 1 
Barwick C.J. then expressed his reasoning in the following passage: 
To confine the scope of the agreement with the stevedore . to a 
period ending with the discharge of the goods . . . is not only 
serious to limit the efficacy of the clauses of the bill of lad-
ing and to defeat the reasonable commercial expectation of the 
consignor and carrierri but it is in my opinion an Unwarranted 
interpretation of the language of the bill of lading. I am un-
able to discover any reason why it should not cover the indepen-
dent stevedore in the on - movement of the cargo. 2 
There were no other interpretations favourable to that of Barwick 
C.J. in the High Court decision of the New York Star. His argument may 
have been better understood if there had been a significant distinction 
drawn between stevedoring and wharfingering by the court. The distinction 
between the two is Still vague. 
The Etrymedon represents the first occasion upon which a Common-
wealth Court has allowed a stevedore to claim, as a third party, the ben-
ifit of exemption clauses in the contract of carriage. However, the New 
Zealand courts, had more definite reasons for allowing the extension of 
liability. There was an unusual relationship between the carrier and 
stevedore. The carrier was a wholly owned subsidiary of the stevedore. 
Also, Carruthers, has pointed out: 
. I suggest that if the New Zealand Courts were confronted 
with the facts in the New York Star, they would make short work 
of the issue, possibly as a result of clearer definition or de-
marcation of the work on the wharf in New Zealand .3 
According to Carruthers, the freight charge in New Zealand is calculated 
1 (1978) 18 A.L.R. 344 
2 ibid., 345 
3Carruthers, 'The impact of the decision in Port Jackson Stevedor-
ing Pty. Ltd. v Salmond and Spraggon (Australia) Pty. Ltd. (the "New York 
Star") - New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd. 
(the - "EurYmedon'9, Maritime LawAPPciatioll.cP/Ilteie4ce, , Christchurch, 1978 ' 	' 	- 
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from hook to hook. The carrier may be liable, even in the case of unload-
ing for stevedore work up and until the time the cargo has been taken off 
the hook. Charges for work beyond the hook are charged to a wharf handl-
ing account. Such work is known as Wharfingering, and not stevedoring. 
The majority in the High Court were very much against extension 
of immunity beyond the ship's rails. Stephen J. stated: 
So interpreted, the carrier's obligations under the bill of lad-
ing determine once and for all when, by disoharge ex the ship's 
rails, the carrier effects due delivery of the goods. 
If the carrier's obligations under the bill determine upon del-
ivery of the goods over the ship's rail, the relevant employment 
of the stevedore referred to in clause 2 will be co-extensive and 
the immunities conferred by that clause will also determine at 
that point.1 
Stephen J. contends that any attempt by the carrier to extend the 
period of immunity beyond the actual contract of carriage, should be re-
jected as the carrier's duties and obligations are completed upon dis-
charge. Therefore, the stevedore ceases to be under employment by the 
carrier. 
Mason and Jacobs JJ. were in agreement with Stephen J., that the 
immunities were not extensions which ought to be made. However, they went 
on to reject Barwick C.J.'s reasoning that the Eurymedon doctrine should 
apply. 
The reasoning underlying the finding of a contract between shipper 
and stevedore is that the immunity or limitation is transferred, 
that what has been called a vicarious immunity or limitation of 
action arises in favour of the stevedore; It would be a great ex-
tension of the Euryinedon doctrine to apply it to a case where the 
servants and agents including independent contractors) all would 
claim, but is one where no liability would arise in the circum-
stances in the carrier. 2 
It would appear that Mason and Jacobs JJ. are contending that on the true 
1 (1978) 18 A.L.R. 349 
2ibid., 356=3'57- 
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construction of the contract, the carrier's responsibility should be limit- 
- ed to the part of the carriage performed as carrier, and that any exemptions 
which extended beyond carriage, no matter Whose benefit the clause may 
cover, should be invalid. 
The EUrymedon, according to Mason and Jacobs JJ. was an accept-
able principle and was one which ought to be binding on the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal. Theit argument of its inapplicability to the New 
York Star, centres around the fact that the event which gave rise to lia-
bility in the stevedore in the Eurymedon occurred before the carrier's 
obligation to deliver had been performed. Thus, any exemptions Which the 
carrier had to protect himself, his agents or independent contractors 
could be enforced, as the goods were in carriage at the time of damage 
Stephen and Murphy JJ., disagreed with the Eurymedon decision. 
Stephen , J. had argued that consideration could not move from the carrier, 
and that the words of the exemption clause must be read as recording a 
contract then and there conoluded. His argument was much the same as 
those in the dissenting judgements in the EUrymedon. Murphy J. concluded 
that there was nothing decided in the Eurymedon that would serve public 
interest. 
As the Eurymedon shows, there is no great difficulty in finding a 
theory to justify extending to a stevedore the immunities and other 
advantages which are expressed to be extended to it by a bill of 
lading. If the adoption of such a theory as part of our deation- 
al law would serve Australia's interest, this should be done • 1 
The public policy argument put forth by Murphy J4 has received little 
comment from the majority of the High Court with respect to the New York 
Star. Although it was never rejected by anyone in the High Court, with 
the exception of Barwick C.J., there was a lack of support for it, and 
its validity was Completely rejected by the Privy Council. 
1 (1578) 18 A.L.R. 358 
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Agency and Bailment 
It would appear that the majority of the High Court argued that 
'agency' between stevedore and carrier can not exist if the exemption 
clauses in the bill of lading covered only the period of carriage uxzand 
until the goods passed over the ship's rails. Mason and Jacobs JJ. stated: 
• . . it does not follow that the appellant was acting as the 
agent of the carrier When it stacked and stored the goods on 
the wharf. The appellant stacked and stored the goods on the Wharf 
on behalf of and at a charge to the holder of the bill of Lading. 
The obligation to stack and store pending delivery was not imposed 
by the bill of lading upon the carrier or upon anyone else. 1 
As pointed out earlier in the Eurymedon, the goods were damaged in the 
course of discharge and the capacity of the stevedore as a petson acting 
on behalf of the carrier was upheld. In the New York Star, the stevedore 
was not acting as an independent contractor employed by the carrier to 
perform obligations for the carrier under the bill of lading, but as a 
bailee. His liability in that capacity is separate from the contract of 
carriage: However, Lork Wilberforce found on the facts of the ease that 
the stevedore could be protected under the exemption clauses in the bill 
of lading. In the Privy Council decision, Lord Wilberforce stated: 
It appears to have been the view both of Stephen J. and of Mason 
and Jacobs JJ. in the High Court that the stevedore was remun-
erated for his services in stacking and storing the goods on the 
wharf by the consignee; this if correct, might be an argument for 
finding that it was not, in respect of these matters; acting in 
the course on employment by the Carrier. In fact, however, the 
evidence, including the actual amount, showed that these charges 
were paid by the ship's agent on behalf of the carrier, thus if 
anything, giving rise to an inference the other way. 2 
The Privy Council then dealt with the literal interpretationsof 
the relevant provisions in the bill of lading to determine the stevedore's 
liability. Clause 5 of the exemptions included: 
The carrier's responsibility in respect of the goods as a carrier 
1 (1978) 18 A.L.R. 356 
2 [19801 3 All- E.R. 262 
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shall not attach until the goods are actually loaded for tran-
sportation upon the ship and shall terminate withour notice as 
soon as the goods leave the ship's tackle at the Port of Dis-
charge from the ship or other place where the carrier is author-
ised to make delivery or end its responsibility. 1 
Clause 8 of the exemptions included: 
Delivery of the goods shall be taken by the consignee or holder 
of the bill of lading from the vessel's rail immediately the 
vessel is ready to discharge, berthed, or not berthed, and con-
tinuously as fast as vessel can deliver notwithstanding any 
custom of the port to the contrary. 2 
Lord Wilberforce indicated that in practice, the consignee seldom takes 
delivery of the goods on the wharf, at the ship's rail. The goods are 
usually stored and stacked in a nearby depot, on or near the wharf, await-
ing collection from the consignee. It would be common sense to infer that 
the carrier would hire a third party to unload, stack and store the goods, 
if the carrier did not do so by common practice. 
The parties must therefore have contemplated that the carrier, 
if it did not store the goods itself, would employ some other 
person to do so: Furthermore a document headed 'Port Jackson 
Stevedoring Pty. Ltd. Basic Terms and Conditions for Stevedor-
ing at Sydney, N.S.W.' showed that it was contemplated that 
the stevedore would be so employed.3 
Lord Wilberforce further indicated that if the stevedore is bailee for the 
goods, and is acting on behalf of the carrier, the carrier would also be 
bailee for the goods if he is acting on his own behalf and would be aff-
orded protection from the exemption clauses in the bill of lading. It 
would stand to reason that the stevedore should be afforded protection if 
he is employed to do tasks that the carrier would have to do otherwise. 
The question may be asked: what is the carrier's position if he 
acts as his own stevedore and himself stacks and stores the goods? 
In the High Court, Stephen J. did not provide an answer to this, 
but, in my view of the provisions referred to above, their Lord-
ships think that the answer is clear, namely that he would be 
1 r 0980 j 3 All E.R. 263 
2loc.cit., 
3ibid., 264 
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liable for them, as bailee, under the contract. If that is so, 
it seems indisputable that if, instead, the carrier employs a 
third party to discharge, stack and store that person wouad be 
acting in the course of his employment, performing duties which 
otherwise the carrier would perform under the bill of lading, 
and so would be entitled to the same immunity as the carrier. 
would have.1 
Consideration and Construction  
of the Agreement 
Barwick C.J. believed that the stevedore's action of unloading the 
goods was consideration for an offer to perform those services, and that 
the stevedore should therefore be afforded protection under the exemption 
clauses. His reasoning was in accord with that of the Privy Council, on 
the subjeCt of 'consideration and construction of the agreement' in the 
Eurymedon. He quoted from the judgement of Lord Wilberforce in the Eury-
Medon: 
. . . the billlof lading brought into existence a bargain initially 
unilateral but capable of becoming mutual, between the shipper and 
the stevedore, made through the carrier as agent. This became a 
full contract when the stevedore performed services by discharging 
the goods. The performance of these services for the benefit of 
the shipper was the consideration for the agreement by the shipper 
that the stevedore should have the benefit of the exemptions and 
limitations contained in the bill of ladihg. 2 
It would appear that this basis for the Eurymedon doctrine requires that 
the consignor will make an offer at large. This unilateral offer may be 
accepted by the stevedore when he acts upon that offer and performs the 
work for which he has contracted for. 
The particular rule of law pertaining to 'offer at large' was 
tested in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. 3 It was held in that case, 
that anyone performing the conditions of a unilateral offer may be entit4. 
led to the benefit of conditions on that contract. 
1 r 
980 3 All E.R. 264 
2(1978) 18- A.L.X; 343 
0893J 1 Q.B. 256. In that case, the defendants, who were the 
proprietors of a medical aid called the 'Carbolic Smoke Ball', issued an 
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Bowen L.J. stated: 
• . . why should not an offer be made to all the world Which is to 
ripen into a contract with anyone who comes forward and performs the 
condition? • • Although the offer is made to the world, the con-
tract is made with that limited portion of the public who come for-
ward and perform the condition on the faith of the advertisment. 1 
In the Eurymedon, acting on the offer and performing the work would gener-
ally be the unloading of the goods by the stevedores. Performance of the 
work will be the acceptance to the offer. "The acceptance of an offer is 
the act which completes the formation of the contract." 2 
If it can be shown that the goods were damaged before unloading 
has commenced, the damage will have occurred before the completion of the 
contract. Any attempt by the stevedore to gain protection from the exemp-
tion clauses would fail. With a bilateral agreement, the contradt is com-
pleted at the time the main contract terms have been agreed upon. A pro-
mise on one side is exchanged for a promise on the other side. With a 
unilateral contract, only the promissor is bound to perform. If an offer 
is made and a party fulfulls the order, the promissor is bound to make pay-
ment. 
It would appear that the unilateral contract analysis would be a 
good theoretical basis for the stevedore because of the lack of considera-
tion problems. However, there are twe problems with the unilateral con- 
advertisement in which an offer of £100 was conveyed, to any person who 
succeeded in contracting influenza after specified use of the smoke ball. 
In the advertisement, it was stipulated that £1000 had been deposited into 
the proprietor's bank account to show their sincerity. On the faith of 
the advertisement, the plaintiff purchased and used the ball as directed, 
but succeeded in catching influenza. She sued for the £100. It was con-
tended by the defendant company, that the advertisement was never meant 
to create a binding obligation between parties, and thatthere could be 
no consideration. In any case, the plaintiff had failed to notify them 
of her acceptance to the offer. Bowen L.J., however, held for the plain-
tiff that the advertisement constituted all offer at large. 
1 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893] 1 Q.B. 259 
2 	_ Atiyah, The Law of Contract, p. 42. 
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tract analysis. One such problem being that the stevedore may not use the 
'agency' argument in conjunction with the unilateral analysis. Davies and 
Palmer stated: 
When a 'unilateral offer' is conveyed from the shipper to the 
stevedore by the intermediary, the carrier, it might be argued 
that the carrier is not acting as an agent in the proper sense. 
of the term: he is transmitting an offer rather than acting as 
a negotiator or participant in the conclusion of the contract 
which results. 1 
Another problem with the unilateral analysis approach is the diff-
iculty of proving the stevedore's !reliance' on a particular offer. It 
was this point that failed to give protection to the stevedore in the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal. In the Court of Appeal decision in the New 
York Star, the plaintiffs had contested the fourth prerequisite of Lord 
Reid's rules in the Scruttons Ltd. v Midland Silicones Ltd. case which 
would have to be satisfied before the stevedore could rely on the exemption 
clauses. Namelk, that any difficulties about consideration moving from the 
stevedore must be overcome. The plaintiffs submitted: 
• . . that the stevedore has failed to show that it gave consid-
eration in the present case. He relies on a principle of con-
tract law not discussed in the Eurymedon. It is the rule that 
where conduct is relied on as the acceptance of and consideration 2 
for an offer the acceptor must be shown to have acted on the offer. 
Phillip Clarke further submitted: 
The defendant's failure to invoke the clause in its favour in this 
ease can be explained by reference to the facts of the case and not 
to a disagreement on principle. Adopting this view of the case, 
it would certainly seem to be a simple matter for stevedores in the 
future to give evidence that they acted in response to the offer of 
protection contained in the exemption clause. 3 
It would be insufficient for the stevedore to simply know of the shipper's 
offer to exempt, there needs to be some proof of his reliance on the offer. 
1 Davies and Palmer, "The Eurymedon Five Years On," Journal of 
Business law, 1979, P. 342 _ 
2 [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 449 
3Clarke, "The Reception of the Eurymedon Decision in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 29 
(January 1980) p. 142 , 
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Quite what needs to be proven is uncertain. English law at least 
seems, as far as the authorities go, firmly set against a search 
for evidence of motivation by the offer; but there are English 
cases which mention some requirement of "acting on" or "acting in 
reliance on" the offer. Some mental element is necessary. 1 
In the High Court decision on the New York Star, Mason and Jacobs 
JJ. indicated that the reliance requirement could be satisfied. 
Common sense and knowledge of human affairs indicate the evident 
probability of the appellant acting in reliance on the shipper's 
promise or offer When he discharges the goods so long as he has 
knowledge of the existence of that promise or offer. 2 
It.would seem, according to Mason and Jacobs JJ., that this reliance re-
quirement may be accepted by the courts on the grounds of common sense and 
human nature. What is not pointed out is what the court's position would 
be if the work on the wharf is performed without reliance on the offer. 
The unilateral contract argument is therefore not without compli-
cations. Not only is there the problem of consideration, but a difficulty 
by the court in determining a unilateral offer in the contract of carriage. 
It was because of this difficulty that Barwick C.J. in the New York Star, 
rejected the unilateral contract argument. 
• . . I do not think the bill can be interpreted as containing 
an offer at large by the consignor.3 
He (Barwick C.J.) felt that there was an offer by the consignor 
to grant immunity to the stevedore on his doing the work. The 
stevedore accepted this offer when the bill of lading was agreed 
to. There then existed an "arrangmnt" which became an enforc-
able contract only when the stevedore adtually did the work and 
thereby provided the consideration.4 
The Privy Council decision on the New York Star decided little 
more on the subject of 'consideration and contract construction', and 
basically approved of Barwick C.J.'s analysis. 
1Davies and Palmer, "The Eurymedon Five Years On", p. 345. 
2(1978) 18 A.L.R. 345' 
ibid., 342 
"Davies and Palmer, "The Eurymedon Five Years On", p 345 
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The provision of consideration by the stevedore was held to follow 
from this board's decision in Satterthwaite's case and in addition 
was independently justified through Barwick_C.J.'s analysis. 1 
Fundamental Breach 
It had been argued bythe consignee in the New York Star, that the 
stevedore had deprived itself of the benefit of clause 17 in the bill of 
lading, the time bar clause. Clause 17 stated: 
In any event the Carrier and the ship shall be discharged from 
all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is 
brought within one year after the delivery of the goods or 
the date when the goods should have been delivered. Suit shall 
not be deemed brought until jurisdiction shall have been ob-
tained over the Carrier and/or the ship by service of process 
or by an agreement to appear. 2 
Counsel for the consignee contended that the bringing of suit within one 
year was a condition with which the innocent party was obliged to comply 
and that the repudiatory breach discharged this condition. The breach, 
being breach of duty as bailee, which resulted in the loss of the con-
signment of razor blades. The consignee also contended that the steve-
dore's negligence as bailee gave rise to an action in tort, which was not 
governed by the time bar. The argument was not accepted in the Privy 
Council decision in the New York Star. Lord Wilberforce stated: 
The reference to deliver of the goods shows clearly that the 
clause is directed towards the carrier's obligations as bailee 
of the goods. It can not be supposed that it admits of a dist-
inction between obligations in contract and liability in tort; 
'all liability' means what it says.3 
It would seem that the carrier need only include the words 'all 
liability' when attempting to exempt himself and his agents, the steve-
dores, as third parties to the contract, with respect to a time clause. 
The Privy Council decision in the New York Star suggests that the words 
'all liability' are wide enough to cover the tort of negligence. The 
1 1980 3 All E.R. 261 
2ibid., 262 
3loc . cit. 
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reasoning put forth by Lord Wilberforce has rejected arguments in the High 
Court decision of Mason and Jacobs JJ., stipulating that the carrier could 
not exempt for the stevedore's negligence. 
• . . it (the stevedore) as bailee failed to take reasonable care 
of the goods. This separate act of negligence was not the subject 
of the bill of lading (which provided that the stevedore was not 
to be under any liability to the consignee for loss, damage, or 
delay) and therefore the appellant was not entitled to rely on the 
limitation of action provision in clause 17. 1 
Lord Wilberforce contended that such a clause as clause 17 in a bill of 
lading, should not be equated with those provisions in the contract which 
relate to performance. 
It is a clause which comes into operation when contractual per-
formance has become impossible, or has been given up; then it 
regulates the manner in which liability for breach of contract 
is to be established. 2 
Their Lordships in the Privy Council found that clause 17 was: 
. • . relevantly indistinguishable from an arbitration clause, 
or a form clause, which on clear authority, survive a repud-
iatory breach. 3 
A later case, Ailsa Craig Fishing Co. Ltd. v Malvern  Fishing Co. 
Ltd. and Another, 4 commented specifically on the subject of 'failure of 
performance' with respect to contractual duties. Lord Wilberforce assumed 
from the facts of that case that the failure of the respondents to provide 
the services contracted for was total, and dealt directly with the concept 
1 (1978) 18 A.L.R. 357 
2b980) Li980.1 3 All E.R. 262 
310c.cit. 
4' [198311 All E.R. 101. In that case, the appellants were the 
owners of a fishing boat which sank due to the respondent's (security com-
pany) negligence. - Condition 2 (f) of the contract stated that in the event 
of the respondents incurring liability for any loss or damage, or the fail-
ure for provision Of services contracted for, liability was to be limited 
to £1000. The.appellants brought an aotion against the respondents claiming 
£55,.000 for the loss of the appellant's vessel, and submitted that condition 
2(f) was not operative as there had been a total failure by the respondents 
to perform any of the contracted obligations. On appeal to the House of 
Lords, Lord Wilberforce held for the respondents. 
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of 'complete failure'. 
This clause (exemption clause) is on the face of it clear. It 
refers to failure in provisionof the services covered by the 
contract. There is no warrant as a matter of construction for 
reading 'failure' as meaning 'partial failure', that is, as 
excluding 'total failure' and there is no warrant in authority 
for so reading the word as a matter of law.1 
Therefore, complete failure of performance and breach of contract by one 
party need not negate limitations of liability provided that the failure 
of performance is incorporated within the conditions by express terms. 
As indicated by Lord Wilberforce in the Privy Council decision of the New 
York Star, the clause itself should regulate the way in which liability for 
failure and breach of contract is to be established. It is therefore quite 
possible to provide a clause in the contract of carriage, that stipulates 
the liabilities and risks of the parties, should the contract come to an 
end, that is, failure of performance by one of the two parties. The con-
dition which limits the liability may survive the repudiatory breach. 
This concept is seen as an equitable means of determining risk apportion-
ment by Lord Wilberforce. 
Clauses of limitation are not regarded by the courts with the 
same hostility as clauses of exclusion: this is because they 
must be related to other contractual terms, in particillAr to 
the risks to which the defending party may be exposed, the re-
numeration which he receives and possibly also the opportunity 
of the other party to insure . 2 
Counsel for the consignee in the New York Star, referred to ob-
servations made by Lord Diplock in Photo Productions Ltd. v Securicor  
; Transport Ltd . 3 . Lord Diplock had specified the obligation of a party to 
do What he had expressly agreed to do, as a 'primary obligation'. In the 
event of failure of performance, or of a breach of primary obligations, 
1 [1983] 1 All E.R. 103 
2loc.cit. 
3 r.. u980] I Lloyd's Rep. 525 
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reimbursement for loss and damage were to be termed as 'secondary obliga-
tions'. The Privy Council which held that an exemption clause applied 
after the discharge, interpreted lord Diplock's reasoning in the Photo 
Productions Ltd. v Securicor Transport Ltd. case as referring only to pri-
mary obligations, whereas the exemption clause in the New York Star gave 
rise to secondary obligations. 
• . . these words were never intended to cover such 'obligations' 
to use lord Diplock's word, as arise when primary obligations have 
been put an end to.. There then arise, on his Lordship's analysis, 
secondary obligations which include an obligation to pay monetary 
compensation. Whether these have been modified by agreement is 
a matter of construction of the contract. The analysis, indeed, 
so far from supporting the respondent's argument, is directly 
opposed to it. 1 
Clause 17 clearly excluded the resopndent's claim. 
Whether an exemption clause continues to operate after a discharge 
of the contracti depends on whether the words or express terms upon their 
proper construction stipulate that it should continue. In the past, courts 
have applied a deliberate 'restrictive construction'. The meaning of terms 
have been strained to reach a construction which reflect a greater sense 
of justice, than what is offered in their ordinary meaning. 
The application of a strict constructionAzads a court to re-
solve ambiguities of meaning, against the party seeking to rely 
on an exemption clause. A deliberately restrictive construction 
involves a Court in straining to discern a latent ambiguity in 
the language or from the surrounding circumstances, so that it 2 
can resolve it against the party relying on the exemption clause. 
Lord Wilberforce, in the Privy Council decision of the New York 
Star, has applied a strict construction in a search for justice as to the 
question of whether or not an agreement for secondary obligations had 
taken place. His intentions are noted with respect to the respondent's 
argument as to the significance of Lord Diplock's primary and secondary 
1 [1980] 3 All E.R. 262 
2Mcgarvie, - "ExedPtion Clauses and Fundamental Breach," Current 
Problems in Law 7 (1981) pi 15 
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obligations, when he stated: "The analysis indeed, so far from supporting 
the respondent's argument, is directly opposed to it." 
The use of a strict construction can not construe a different mean- . 
ing. A modification of the terms or language in the contract which the 
parties have used in the exemption clause, can not be implicated unless 
it is necessary to give effect to What the parties had originally intended. 
In the High Court decision of the New York Star, Barwick C.J. stated: 
• . . whilst exemption clauses . . . should be construed strictly, 
they are of course enforceable according to their terms unless 
their application according to those terms Should lead to an ab- 
surdity or defeat the main object of the contract or, for some 
other reason, justify the cutting down of their scope. 1 
However, as indicated previously, the courts may apply to exemp-
tion clauses, a deliberately restrictive construction, in which the terms 
will be strained to reach a meaning which implies a more equitable con-
struction than that indicated by express terms. If there is an imbalance 
between the competing interests of the stevedore and the owner of the 
goods, the courts can resolve it against the stevedore relying on the ex-
emption clause, if he (the stevedore) is in a superior bargaining position. 
Lord Reid had stated: 
Exemption clauses differ greatly in many respects . . . in the ord-
inary way the customer has no time to read them, and if he did he 
would probably not understand them. And if he did understand end 
object to any of them, he would generally be told he could take 
it or leave it . . . Freedom to contract must surely imply some 
choice or room for bargaining. 2 
The Photo Productions Ltd. v Securicor Transport Ltd. case suggests 
that a deliberately restrictive construction will not apply in situations 
where the parties are of equal bargaining strength. 3 It will also not 
apply where a statute regulates exemption clauses. Since the Suisse  
1 (1978) 18 A.L.R. 340 
2 	- Suisse AtlintiOue Societe d'Armement Maritime S.A.  v N.V. Rotter- 
damsche Kolen Centrals [1961] 1 A.C. 406 
3Lord Wilberforce in Photo - Productions Ltd. v Securicor Transport 
Ltd. [1980] 1 All E.R. 564 
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Atlantioue Societe d'Armenent Maritime S.A. v N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Cen-
rale.case, parliament has passed the Unfair Contract . Terms cActii 1977. Lord 
Wilberforce in the Photo Productions Ltd. v Securicor Transport Ltd. case, 
referred to this Act: 
This Act . . . enables exemption clauses to be applied with re-
gard to what is just and reasonable . . . when the parties are 
not of unequal bargaining power, and when risks are normally 
borne by insurance, not only is the case for judicial inter-
vention undemonstrated, but there is everything to be said . . . 
for leaving the parties free to apportion the risks as they think 
fit and for respecting their decisions. 
1 1980 
	All E.R. 561 
CHAPTER IV 
nis: AUSTRALIAN POSITION 
The Applicability of the Eurymedon 
and the New York Star 
Much of What had been decided in the EUrymedon with respect to cap-
acity, agency, consideration and contract construction had been either re-
jected or ignored in the High Court decision of the New York Star. 
. . . the disagreement among the members of the High Court of 
Australia must give cold comfort to the advocates of the Eury-
medon doctrine. 1 
However, the Privy Council upheld the EUrymedon in their decision on the 
New York Star. 
It seemed after the Scruttons Ltd. v Midland Silicones Ltd. case, 
that courts would eventually allow a third party benefit under a bill of 
lading, providing Lord Reid's conditions of exemption were applicable and 
adequately drafted as conditions in the contract. 
Although the immediate result of Midland Silicones was a denial 
of such protection, its opposition to the principle of third 
party immunity was not implacable; and in 1974 the Privy Council 
finally conceded that the relevant third party (in this case a 
stevedore) could secure relief provided that Lord Reid's condi-
tions were fulfilled.2 
Most Commonwealth Courts Which have considered the conditions in Scruttons  
Ltd. v Midland Silicones Ltd. have been lower courts, whereas the Privy 
Council, with the exemption of the EUrymedon and the New York Star, has 
More often discarded Lord Reidls conditions as being inapplicable in any 
cases brought forward. 
1 Carruthers, op.cit., p. 13 
2Davies and Palmer, op.cit., p. 337 
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• . . the most senior court to examine the case (the EUrymedon) 
has produced not only the strongest outright reservations about i 
its legitimacy but the most diverse and conflicting judgements. 
Therefore, the Australian position as to third party liability 
under the bill of lading had been somewhat vague after the conclusion of 
the Privy Council ruling in the New York Star. Privy Council decisions on 
appeal from the High Court should be treated as High Court decisions. It 
is not surprising however, that uncertainties and doubts about the decision 
have encouraged cargo owners in Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v Hapag-
Lloyd Aktiengesellsdhaf and others and Sidney Cooke Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd  
3 Aktiengesellschaf and Another, to bring the matter back before the High 
Court for reconsideration. 
Reinforcement of the Principles  
The two recent decisions in Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v 
Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaf and others, and Sidney Cooke Ltd. v Hapag-
Lloyd Aktiengesellschaf and Another, have commented favourably on the 
Privy Council decision in the New York Star. In Broken Hill Proprietary Co. 
v Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaf and others, a carrier's agent damaged 
goods in transit due to negligence. Clause 4 (1) of the bill of lading 
provided that the carrier should be entitled to Sub-contract the carriage. 
Clause 4 (2) stipulated that there should be no claims made against any 
party by whom any part of the carriage was performed. Broken Hill Prop-
rietary Co. Ltd. sued both the carrier and agent. Yeldham J. in the Sup-
reme Court of New South Wales stated that: 
Some of the foregoing defences . . . raise squarely for consid-
eration the application to this bill of lading, and to the circ-
umstances of the present case, of principles enunciated in New 
1 Davies and Palmer, op.cit., p. 337. 
2r 098011J 2 N.S.W.L.R. 572 
3ibid., 587 
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Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd. and 
in Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty. Ltd. v Salmond and Spraggon 
(Australia) Pty. Ltd.1 
Having indicated the relevance of the principles in both the New 
York Star and the Eurymedon to Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v Hapag-
LloydiktiengellesChaf and others, Yeldham J. held that the carrier could 
by express terms in clause 4 (1), sub-contract their duties, and by doing 
so were able to transfer indemnity to his agent, the third party (clause 
4 (2) ). Because the plaintiff agreed hot to make any claim against the 
various people, including sub-contractors, a stay of proceedings, equiv-
alent to an injunction, preventing the cargo owner from pursuing a claim 
against the sub-contractor, was applied. In effect, the exact terms of 
clause 4 (2) of the bill of lading, which Contained a promise that the 
cargo owner will not make a claim against the sub-contractor, had been 
given effect to. 
In Sidney Cooke Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengelleschaf and Another, 
Hapag entered into a contract of carriage with the vendor of certain goods, 
the vendor endorsed the bill of lading over to Cooke, the purchaser. The 
goods were damaged whilst in control of the agent of Hapag before the del-
ivery to Cooke. The bill of lading contained a definition of 'carriage' 
which included the whole of the operation from receipt until delivery. 
It had also been stipulated that the carriage could be sub-contracted, as 
it had been in clause "4 (1) in Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v  Hapag- 
Lloyd Aktiengelleschaf'and - others, and, that indemnity to the sub-contract-
or could be transferred as in clause 4 (2) of the same ease. Cooke sued 
Hapag and the agents for damages. 
Yeldham J. held that clause 4 (1) would be binding and that clause 
4 (2) of the bill of lading would not be r limited in its operation only to 
1 [1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 577 
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the carriage by sea. Clause 5(B)(2)(a) made reference to three stages in 
the carriage where damage was possible. 
(A) from receipt of the goods until loading; (B) during the 1 
carriage by sea; and (C) from disoharge until delivery . . . 
Yeldham J., in agreement with Barwick C.J. in the High Court decision of 
the New York Star, ruled that: 
. . . as a matter of practice, the carrier could be expected 
to sub-contract toathers the unloading and storage of goods, 
and their delivery to the consignee.2 
It would appear that sub-contracting, and transfer of indemnity to 
third parties which have been specifically appointed as agents to the carr-
ier, is now acceptable under contractual 7_ arrangements. It also seems poss-
ible for the carrier and agents to obtain a promise that the cargo owner 
will not make a claim against the sub-contractor, as in clause 4(2), in 
both Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengelleschaf and  
others, and Sidney Cooke, Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengelleschaf and Another. 
The Himalaya Clause need not refer solely to sub-contractors, but any per-
sons performing services covered in the definition of carriage. 
The cargo owner will now have a much more difficult task in claim-
ing against the sub-contractor. Not only has he agreed not to make claims 
against the sub-contractor, or other agents, but to indemnify the carrier 
as well. 
• • . he (the cargo owner) has to indemnify the carrier against 
any consequence . . . the carrier has to indemnify the sub-con-
tractor in a user contract and this brings into play what is 
commonly referred to as the circular indemnity. The merchant 
ends up meeting his own claim . . . It, I think can probably be 
said that clause 4 (2) is the ultimate Himalaya clause .3 
, Yeldham J. has agreed with the Privy Council reasoning in the New 
1 [1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 588 
2loc.cit. 
3Scotford, "Current Status of the Himalaya Clause", Insurance 
Broker, (June 1981),p. 15. 
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York Star, that a search should not be sought for fine distinctions Which 
would : 
• . . confine the contract of carriage to the mere sea-leg of 
the entire operation and preclude a stevedore or a person in the 
situation of a second defendant from receiving the benefit of a 
Clause such as that presently under consideration. 1 
As long as no distinctions are sought and the period of carriage is well 
defined, then the carrier and sub-contractor may avoid liability for dam-
age by express terms in the bill of lading. 
Transferability of the Pfinciples  
In the 1981 case, Celthene Pty. Ltd. v W.K.J. Hauliers Pty. Ltd. 
and Another Yeldham J. transferred the principles in the New York Star  
and the Eurymedon to the road haulage industry. In that case, it was dec-
ided that the sub-contractor of a carrier was entitled to the protection 
of exemption clauses contained in aT,consignment note Which had clauses 
under which the carrier could sub-contract the carriage, and that the 
carrier -..would not be liable in tort or contract or otherwise for any loss 
or damage to the goods. 
Counsel for the plaintiff had argued that the New York Star and 
the Eurymedon were wrongly decided and in any event, only related to sea 
carriage, 
He argued . . • that those decisions, and the relevant part of 
"Lord Reid's speech to which reference has been made, should in 
any event be confined to cases of carriage of goods by sea, 
with Which they dealt0 
However, YeIdham J. stated: 
Certainly none of the decisions to which I was referred or which 
I have consulted for myself lend support to the view that the 
1 r L19801 2 N.S.W.L.R. 596 
2 [1981} 1 N.S.W.L.R. 606 
3ibid., 610 
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principles of the Eurymedon . . . or of Salmond and Snraggon . . . 
may only successfully be applied in eases concerned, as they were, 
with sea carriage. 1 
It is common ..practice to sub-contract either some or all of the 
carriage of goods in both the sea and road transport industries. There-
fore, there is no doubt that both modes of transport will share the same 
problems as to the right to legally sub-contract and claim exemption for 
some or all liability incurred, with respect to the carriage. It is nec-
essary for the cargo owner and carrier to know the risk of each party, 
before carriage takes place. This principle can not differ between modes 
of transport, if parties are to effectively insure against their risks. 
A bill of lading may contain clauses that stipulate that the carrier has 
the right to sub-contract part of the carriage to a different mode of 
transport. This would not be unusual where final delivery requires a com-
bined transport operation. One set of legal principles covering the carr-
iage by land, and another to cover the carriage of goods by sea, would only 
complicate the legal positions. Apportionment of risk would be difficult 
to determine, which would affect not only efficient rates of carriage, but 
create a dilemma between both parties as to the need of insuring against 
risks. Yeldham J. stated that: 
• . • it is plain that the same problems are arising and will 
continue to arise with greater frequency in the future in the 
case of road transport, especially with the ever increasing 
tendency for much of it to be sub-contracted, and for consig-
nors to be given the option of insuring the goods or themselves 
accepting the risk of damage. 2 
It had also been decided that whenever sub-contractors and their 
servants seek exemption under a contract of carriage by road, to which 
they are not expressed parties, regard must be taken as to the conditions 
laid down by Lord Reid in Scruttons Ltd. v Midland Silicones Ltd., much 
1 Celthene Pty. Ltd. v W.K.J. Hauliers Pty. Ltd. [1981] 1 N.S.W.L .R . 611 
2ibid., 611-612- 
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the same as they would be in contracts of carriage by sea. In the Celthene  
Pty. Ltd. v W.K.J. Hauliers Pty. Ltd. and Another case, 
• . . counsel for the defendants, submitted that each of the 
criteria referred to by Lord Reid in Scruttons Ltd. v Midland  
Silicones Ltd. . . . (and treated by the majority of the Jud-
icial Committee of the Privy Council in the Eurymedon , . • 1 
as being the relevant matters to be proved) were satisfied. 
The decision in the Celthene Pty. Ltd. v W.K.J. Hauliers Pty. Ltd. 
and Another case, was upheld in the recent decision of Life Savers (Aust-
ralasia) Ltd. v Frigmobile Pty. Ltd. and Another 	In that case, perish- 
able goods (chocolate) were spoiled en route in a refrigerated van. The 
van was operated by an employee (first respondent) of the van owner, (sec-
ond respondent) who had agreed to carry the goods under a bill of lading. 
The contract contained an exclusion of liability clause for damage to 
goods, which included both carrier as agent and other sub-contractors. 
Hutley J.A. stated: 
• . . the second respondent who accepted the chocolate did so 
on an invoice which purported to confer immunity upon him, and 
there is no reason to believe that this was not important to 
him. When he accepted the goods for delivery, it was pursuant 
to a form of contract drawn up so as to appear to protect him. 3 
Hutley J.A. indicated that the judgement of Yeldham J. in the Celthene  
Pty. Ltd. v W.K.J. Hauliers Pty. Ltd. and Another case, was correct. He 
also spoke generally about the commercial aspects of limitation or exclu-
sion of liability clauses in bills of lading, suggesting that commercial 
reality demands a literal interpretation of the conditions. 
Any businessman's reading of this provision (exclusion of lia-
bility) . . . would know that whatever happened to the goods 
was at his risk and if he wished to protect himself he did so 
by insurance. . . . In a competitive market, a consignor can, 
no doubt, find carriers who will carry goods at more favour- 
1 r cl 981j 1 N.S.W.L.R. 610 
2Supreme Court, 	. Court of Appeal. Hutley, Glass, Mahoney 
JJ. - 2nd June 1983 No. C.A. 301 of 1982 
3ihid., 11 
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able terms as to liability but, no doubt, at higher cost. 1 
Both Hutley J.A. and Yeldham J. refused to limit the decisions 
in the New York Star and the Eurymedon to sea carriage. Therefore, it is 
apparent from the Celthene Pty. Ltd. v W.K.J. Hauliers Pty. Ltd. and An-
other, and Life Savers (Australasia) Ltd. v Friamobile Pty. Ltd. and An-
other cases, that both the New York Star and the Eurymedon are applicable 
to all forms of carriage where sub-contracting takes place. 
1 Supreme Court, N.S.W. . Court of Appeal. Hutley, Glass, Mahoney 
JJ. - 2nd June 1983 No. C.A. 301 of 1982 
CHAPTER V 
DISCOURAGING NWaLIGENCE 
It has been suggested that the tendency of law relating to contracts 
which attempt to extend protection to third parties under Himalaya clause 
provisions, is dangerous, because it neglects the proposition that, it 
would only be fair and equitable for persons causing damage to cargo, to 
be held responsible or liable for the damage or loss which had been caused 
by their negligende, otherwise they may continue to be irresponsible in 
they course of their duties. There is also the argument that it would be 
commercially unreal to suggest that warehousemen, hauliers, and stevedores, 
are going to be negligent in their practices in a competitive environment, 
for the reasons of having protection under exemption clauses, which have 
been derived so that the apportionment of the risk can be properly dic-
tated by way of insurance. 
Many sub-contractors will attempt to exclude their liability in 
their user contracts. Some state that if they are negligent, they will 
only be liable up to a certain amount in respect of damage or loss. Such 
exemption or exclusion clauses which protect the sub-contractor, may be 
taken into consideration by the carrier when setting freight rates. How-
ever, if the carrier finds the services of the sub-contractor negligent 
often, the carrier himself will end up meeting the claims of his clients, 
or if he has exempted himself and the subcontractor, thereby claiming 
immunity, he will eventually lose his credibility in an open market. This 
situation would be unlikely where the carrier has a wide choice of sub-
contracting services at his disposal. Also.;: in the case where a carrier 
sub-contracts to a road haulier, he will often find that it id an owner/ 
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driver operation, where, the due diligence and care of the owner is extend-
ed, for the purposes of widening clientel and business contracts. Even 
if an owner/driver could not be held accountable for acts of negligence, 
loss of credibility in a competitive environment, would eventually force 
his services out of 4re market. 
Therefore, it would seem that the carrier should bear the respon-
sibility of providing clauses of limitations and exclusions in the main 
contradt of carriage, and arranging for the proper channels of transport 
by way of sub-contracting, as opposed to having several individual contracts 
covering each leg of the journey. Scotford stated: 
• . . for the apportionment of risk and the arrangement of in-
surance, it seems to me to be sensible for the carrier to say 
that it is against him that claims should be made and not ag-
ainst sub-contractors .1 
In accordance with this hypothesis, he also stated: 
• . • in the modern world of combined transport the regime of 
risk that has been adopted is that the carrier, consistent with 
his accepting responsibility to move the goods from point A to 
point B, says: 'I will be responsible for them during that en-
tire operation, subject to some agreed exemptions, and if you 
have any complaint you should direct it to me and not to one 
of my sub-contractors.' 2 
If sub-contractors are having to continually honour claims and 
arrange for protection through insurance policies and employ the necessary 
clerical branches to cope with claims for damage or loss, not only will 
freight rates increase, but the additional bureaucracy needed for the ex-
panded operation will dearease its efficiency. The sub-contractor need 
only execute that portion of the carriage which he has contracted for, 
with the specialized services and staff under his jurisdiction. Therefore, 
there is no need to discourage negligent acts, by making the sub-contract-
or strictly liable for damage or loss, as he will execute his duties with 
1 Scotford, op.cit., p. 15 
2loc.cit. 
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as much care as he can reasonably exercise, as his services are already 
subjected to the competition °father specialists, in the same field. 
Scotford stated: 
If sub-contractors are . . . having to arrange insurance on 
the basis that they have that exposure, and if they have to 
have . . . infrastructure to deal with claims handling and 
the attendant costs, then inevitably their charges will 
increase. . . 1 
1 	. Scotford, op.cit., p. 15 
CHAPTER VI 
INSURANCE FOR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY 
Cost of Insurance  
Freight rates are established with respect to insurance costs and 
the apportionment of risk. Contractual agreements with expressed terms 
of exemptions are arranged between the carrier and cargo owner. It would 
stand to reason that the less risk the carrier assumes, the lower the cost 
of carriage. This has been recognised by Yeldham J. in Sidney Cooks Ltd. 
V HanaR-Lloyd Aktiengelleschaf and Another: 
• . . the bill of lading is to give effect to the clear inten-
tions of a commercial document • . . the affect of damaging 
validity to the clause would be to encourage actions against 
servants, agents, and independent contractors in order to get 
round exemptions (which are almost invariably and often com-
pulsory) accepted by shippers against carriers, the existence, 
and presumed efficacy, of which is reflected in the rates of 
freight. 1 
If insurance rates are a portion of the freight rate, recommended 
premiums should be practical and lead to improvements in handling perfor-
mance. This should not only reduce incidence: of damage, but lead to a 
reduction in premiums over the long run. 
A practical method of insuring cargo, which would provide both 
reasonable levels of premiums and discourage acts of negligence, would be 
. to place a limit as to the maximum amoUnt for which the carrier is liable. 
This limitation contained in the contract of carriage is known as a 're-
leased bill of lading'. 2 Shippers can be induced to use a released bill 
1 [1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 594 
2Wherry & Newman, Insurance and Risk, p. 46 
38 
39 
of lading, through a reduced rate. This will satisfy shippers that the 
carrier will use reasonable care, as he will be held somewhat responsible 
for his negligence. 
In the case of an all-risk policy, the carrier will cover all his 
costs in the rates of carriage. However, the shipper need not be concern-
ed with the carrier's ability to pay for that portion of the loss, for 
which he would be bound to pay under a released bill of lading, and full 
value of the goods will be guaranteed. 
Where high value commodities are shipped, it would be in the car-
go owner's interest to have the goods carried under a full-risk policy, 
by the carrier, or take out the appropriate coverage for the full value 
of the goods himself, to cover for loss or damage, howsoever caused, if 
the carrier and his agents have been excluded from liability. Freight 
rates and insurance coverage, are a small portion of the retail cost of 
higher value goods, therefore, their related Costs of transport are less 
important to the owner of those goods, than they would be to the shipper 
of lower valued commodities. The related costs of transport and insurance 
have a greater impact on the retail price of lower valued commodities. 
In these situations, the shipper will be encouraged to transport his car-
go either under a released bill of lading, or entirely at his own risk 
to reduce his costs, and market his cargo at a more competitive price. 
He will have to bear any costs borne through spoilage en route, howsoever 
caused. 
Even though the assured's activities may be restricted to a par-
ticular Country, the claims arising from those activities should be cov-
ered world wide. There should be a degree of uniformity in the handling 
of claims everywhere, so the parties know exactly their position as to 
apportionment of responsibility for risk management. 
The Privy Council in both the Eurvmedon and New York Star, 
was at pains to say that the law should if possible, be the 
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same on both sides of the Pacific and to extend the analogy, 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 1 
Definition of Carrier and Stevedore  
for Insurance Purposes  
At the present time, the Hague Rules cover the sea carriage of 
goods in Australia. However, other international conventions such as the 
Have Visby Rules, govern European shipments to Australia and the Hamburg 
Rules, which have not yet come into operation, are also intended to govern 
Sea carriage on an international basis. The Hague Rules themselves do not 
offer any specific definitions of the term 'carrier' Which makes the all-
ocation of risk under bills of lading and insurance contracts difficult. 
This concept could explain the reasons why Yeldham J. in agreement with 
the Privy Council in the New York Star had stipulated that a search for 
fine distinctions need not be encouraged, which would prevent either a 
stevedore or other sub-contractor from receiving exemptions under a clause 
in the contract. 
The definition of 'carrier' in Art. 1 of the Hague Rules is 
not exhaustive andfurnishes little assistance in a case such 
as the present.2 
In Sidney Cooke Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengelleschaf and Another, 
Yeldham J. had stipulated that those who have been sub-contracted part or 
all of the sea-leg, are not 'carriers' for the purposes of Article 3, rule 
8 of the Hague Rules. Since these sub-contractors were not carriers, no 
action could be brought against them under clause 4 (1) of the bill of 
lading. 
A sea carrier, to whom has been sub-contracted the sea-leg of 
the combined transport operation to Which the bill of lading re-
lates, and whose contract is not with the consignor or consignee 
but with the carrier as defined by the bill of lading in the 
1 Scotford, 	p. 15 
2 [19801 2 N.S.W.L.R. 595 
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present case, is not the carrier . . 1 
The Hague Visby Rules extend to servants and agents, but there is 
no mention of independent contractors. If damages are sought against the 
carrier's servants or agents, then they may seek immunity Under limits of 
liability which the carrier may stipulate under the rules. 
Under the Hamburg Rules, servants or agents acting under the dir-
ection of their employer may also enjoy exemptions and limitations which 
the carrier may invoke in the bill of lading. Once again, there is no 
mention of independent contractors. An authority or precedent will be 
needed to bring independent contractors .within the scope of servants or 
agents, so as to allow them a deliberate and unquestionable benefit of ex-
emption clauses in contracts for sea carriage. A degree of uniformity 
would also determine where responsibility for damage will lie. 
Whether responsibility for unloading procedures at terminals is 
the responsibility of ship's management, terminal staff or port authority, 
adequate insurance cover is essential. Port authorities are generally re-
quired by law to take out insurance against liability towards its own em-
ployees. However, protection will still be required against third party 
risks, particularly those associated with stevedoring or wharfingering. 
The definition of a stevedore is a person who undertakes the han-
dling of cargo by the loading or discharging of a vessel. The wharf inger 
handles the cargo in storage. A definition of marine insurance is given 
in the United Kingdom Marine Insurance Act, as follows: 
A contract whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assur- 2 
ed in manner and to the extent thereby agreed against marine losses. 
That is to say, the losses incidental to marine adventure. 'To indemnify 
the assured', means to place the assured, in the event of loss or damage;_ 
1 	• 1980 2 N.S.W.L.R. 595 
2United Kingdom Marine Insurance Act, 1906 
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in as near as possible the same position as he would have occupied had 
the loss not occurred., 
Stevedoring itself is an accident-prone operation, and will be-
come even more so as it becomes increasingly important for both port auth-
orities and shipowners to limit the size of the work force, and loading 
and unloading time at each port, in order to minimise costs. Even normal 
loading, unloading, and stowage operations can subject cargo to damage. 
For example, heavy cargoes can not be stowed over light loads. Coal and 
grain cargoes are liable to combust, if proper ventilation is not provided, 
and care must be taken so that shifting boards are inserted in holds, to 
stop the shifting of loads. Also, mistakes in the loading order of goods, 
will increase not only the chances of accidents through the reshifting of 
cargo, but handling costs as well. Thus, a ship which calls on ports A, 
B, and C, must load its cargo in the reverse order of C I B, and A. A fast 
ship turn-around time may be desirable both from the point of view of the 
shipowner and the export market, but undue haste leads to less care being 
taken and to the greater likflihood of claims. 
Appropriate wording is needed in the exemption clauses to cover 
the entirety of the stevedore's activities. 
Coverage should be designed which is all embracing without the 
word 'stevedore' mentioned in the insuring clauses. Remember-
ing the definition of a stevedore, particularly the relation-
ship with a wharfinger or warehouseman, it must be appreciated 
that if insurance was merely arranged for Stevedore's Liability 
the policy would fail to cover the client's full activities with 
the consequent risks of some areas of activity remaining uninsur-
ed - this is a common fault in these policies. 1 
The aim in assessing any risk, is to ascertain the elements of 
work and aspects of operation and then determine the limit of liability, 
with respect to the cargo value. The elements of work would include all 
1 Dawes, et. al., "Cargo Handlers - Liabilities & Insurance" Paper 
No. 5, for the United Kingdom Section of the International Cargo Handling 
Co-ordination Association, - p. 39. 
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those services which are related to the entire carriage. In this respect, 
attention should also be drawn to the services provided by sub-contractors, 
in a combined operation, such as the road hauliers, when determining the 
necessary terms and clauses in an insurance policy. 
CHAPTER VII 
WORDING OF CONDITIONS IN 
CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE 
In practice, the bill of lading is issued by the carrier and com-
pleted by the shipper. When the shipowner agrees to its terms, he signs 
it. The bill of lading is, by express terms, the agreement between the 
shipper and the carrier. All limitations of liability will be incorpor-
ated within the contract. 
The Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand's Seaway Cargo Express 
Service, has under its conditions of contract in section 22, a clause 
which exempts both the carrier and his agents. 
Neither USSCo nor any Carrier's Agent shall be under any duty or 
liability whatsoever, and no claim shall be made or brought by 
any owner or other person against USSCo or any Carrier's Agent 
for or in respect of any loss or damage . . . The provisions of 
this Condition shall apply not withstanding that such loss, dam- 1 
age, . . . be solely or partly caused by . . . negligence . . . 
In light of the vague connotations of the term 'agent', and the 
fact that the Hague Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules only extend to ser-
vants and agents of the carrier, USSCo has identified the carrier's agent 
in clause 1 under 'conditions of contract', as one' 'who is a contractor 
or who at any time during the Carriage is or becomes a servant or agent 
of USSCo or of a contractor'. Such strategy may satisfy the courts, if 
the reasoning of Yeldham J. is adopted, and fire distinctions as to the 
status of contractors or their role in the definition of carriage, are 
discouraged. 
1 Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand 'Ltd., Seaway Cargo Express 
Servide Contract, Section 22 
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Definition of carriage is also provided in clause 1 to prevent 
the courts in the event of legal action, from determining whether or not 
carriage extended beyond the sea-leg. 
The Carriage means the receipt of the Cargo by or on behalf of 
'PSC° at the Despatch Terminal and the transportation of the same 
to, and the delivery thereof . . . and includes ancillary matters 
which may be incidental . . . while it is in control of USSCo or 
any Carrier's Agent. 1 
Furthermore, in clause 13, USSCo has stipulated that after cargo has been 
disrhilrged, dither the carrier or Carrier's agent shall be at liberty to 
abandon it- If unclaimed, it may be stored or transferred at the discre-
tion of the carrier at the risk and expense of the owner. Such a clause 
was held to be binding in Broken Hill Proprietary Co. ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd  
AktienRelleschaf and others, where Yeldham J. ruled, in agreement with 
Barwick C.J. in the High Court case of the New York Star, that the carrier 
could sub-contract the unloading and storage of goods to others, if the 
carrier himself did not stack and store cargo as a matter of practice. 
USSCo had also stipulated in clause 5 in the bill of lading: 
USSCo may contract or arrange on any terms for the whole or any 
portion of the carriage to be performed by any other person or 
persons and in these Conditions 'contractor' means any such 
person.2 
Clause 5 has much the same purpose as clause 4 (1) in Broken Hill 
Proprietary Co. Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd AktienRelleschaf and others and 
Sidney Cooke Ltd. v HapaR-Lloyd AktienRelleschaf and Another, where the 
carrier stated that part, or all, of the carriage could be contracted out. 
However, USSCo has failed to provide a clause that would prevent 
the cargo owner from bringing action against servant and agents of the 
carrier. Furthermore, unlike the conditions of contract in either the 
Broken: Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd AktienRelleschaf and others  
/USSCo, Section 22, op.cit. 
2 	- loc.cit. 
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or Sidney Cooke Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengellesdhaf and Another cases, 
USSCo has in clause 25 of their conditions, named their agents as parties 
to the contract of Carriage. This would suggest that each party to the 
contract would have to cover their full activities with the consequent 
risk of their particular operations, with insurance. Yeldham J. in Sidney 
Cooke Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengellesdhaf and Another had stipulated that 
those Who have been sub-contracted part or all of the carriage, were not 
'carriers' for the purposes of Article 3 rule 8 of the Hague Rules. 
Since these sub-contractors were not carriers, they were not parties to 
the contract, and no action for damages or loss could be brought against 
them. Therefore, if each agent or contractor employed by USSCo takes out 
his own insurance, freight rates will increase. 
Korea Australia Searoad Service (KASS), specifies in their condi-
tions of contract, that the Hague Rules will be the law governing the bill 
of lading. The Hague Rules do allow for an extension of liability, and 
ASS has indicated in clause 4 (1) of their contract of carriage that the 
carrier is entitled to sub-contract, and under clause 4 (3), that limit-
ation of liability should extend to protect the carrier's employees. 
KASS has also included in clause 4 (5), a provision in which the 
cargo owner promises to make no claims against any carrier's employee, 
and employee includes sub=contractors. In Broken Hill Proprietary Co. 
Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengelleschaf and others and Sidney Cooke Ltd. v 
Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengellesdhaf and Another, Yeldham J. ruled that a promise 
not to bring action for damages or loss was binding. His reasoning was 
based on the fact that the freight rate is set in accordance with the risk 
of loss or damage that the cargo owner must sustain, and the lower insur-
ance costs borne by the carrier. 
The carrier is identified in section 1, as the party 'by or on 
behalf of which this Bill of Lading is signed and issued.' The Carrier's 
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employees, including sub-contractors are therefore not parties to the 
contract. The carrier in this instance need only insure against his own 
risks. This factor simplifies the calculatiomlof the freight rate, and 
makes commercial estimates according to cost more accurate. Having the 
carrier assume all liability for cargo, including his limitations of lia-
bility, also simplifies the basis of agreement between shipper and carrier, 
as apportionment of risk is more easily determined by both parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Lord Reid's conditions in Scruttons ltd. v Midland Silicones Ltd., 
may permit a stevedore to act as agent for the carrier. Despite this, 
however, the strict doctrines underlying privity of contract, and the diff-
iculty of proving a principle and agency situation, resulted in the con-
flicting judgements in the High Court decision of the New York Star. Fur-
thermore, the Hague Rules, Hague Visby Rules, and Hamburg Rules, which 
have extended protection to agents of the carrier, have made little, or 
no mention of extended protection to the sub-contractors. These conven- 
tions, have merely added to the vague and uncertain aspects of third party 
liability. The Privy Council ruling which reversed the High Court decision, 
still left apprehension amongst carriers, stevedores and insurers, as to 
the status of third parties under a bill of lading, until the matter had 
been tested again and reaffirmed, in Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v 
Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengelleschaf and others, and Sidney Cooke Ltd. v Hapag; 
Lloyd Aktiengelleschaf and Another. 
After the recent decisions in these two cases, it appears that the 
Australian High Court will now uphold the Privy Council decision in the 
New York Star, providing that third parties have been appointed agents to 
the carrier, and limitation of liability clauses have been clearly defined. 
The recent deviation that now allows third party protection under a bill 
of lading, may be celebrated as a new means of fixing efficient rates of 
carriage, as well as effective insurance coverage. A basic understanding 
of risk bearing and protective provisions under the contract of carriage, 
allows both the carrier and the owner of the goods to contract under ex-
press terms. This means that the terms operate under their ordinary 
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meaning, without requiring a search for fine distinctions, which qualify 
or change the status of the original agreement. 
The recent decision in the Celthene Pty. Ltd. v W.K.J. Hauliers  
Pty. Ltd. and Another case, has encompassed the rule of law pertaining 
to third party immunity under contracts of carriage by sea, with the road 
haulage industry. This indicates that third party immunity under contracts 
of carriage is now possible for all modes of transport, operating on any 
leg of the journey, providing appropriate limitation and exemption clauses 
have been drafted. This principle was upheld and reaffirmed in the Life 
Savers (Australasia) Ltd. v Frigmobile Pty. Ltd. and Another case. 
A properly drafted Himalaya clause and exemption clause should be 
constructed so as to include all of those parties connected with the 
carriage, as carriage and delivery may require the services of several 
parties, such as warehousemen, road hauliers, and stevedores. It is also 
useful if a definition of 'carriage' is expressed in the bill of lading 
in order to determine which elements of the sea-leg, or road haul, are 
included under limitation of liability. This would determine the protec-
tion afforded to all parties and services connected with the carriage and 
delivery of the goods. Also, a knowledge of all the segments of trans-
port, connected with the carriage, will assist in determining where the 
risk of damage or loss is likely to occur, judging from the nature of 
the goods and the transport services required. Appropriate insurance 
coverage can then be determined, for the recovery of either the total value 
of the goods or a portion thereof. 
In order to get to a point of commercial reality; the protection 
and liabilities of all parties to the carriage must be realized. Further-
more, the services required for carriage and delivery must be known and 
identified before efficient rates of carriage, insurance rates, and eff-
ective provisions for exemption and limitation of liability, can be set. 
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Lord Wilberforce in the EUrymedon summed up the proper principle upon 
which the contract of carriage is made: 
The whole contract is of a commercial character involving ser-
vices on the one side, rates of payment on the other and qual-
ifying stipulations as to both. The relations of all parties 
to each other are commercial relations entered into for business 
reasons of ultimate profit. 1 
1 19751 A.C. 167 
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